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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY V. LARSEN and MARY 
KAYE and SANDRA LEE LAR-
SEN, minors by their Guardian Ad 
Litem, MARY V. LARSEN, and IN-
TERMOUNTAIN SERVICE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
CLOVER D. CHRISTENSEN and 
VERNON L. STEVENSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
10,833 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs and appellants 
against defendant and respondent Dr. Vernon L. 
Stevenson and also against the defendant Clover D. 
Christensen to recover damages for the death of 
plaintiffs' decedent, Kurt E. Larsen, as a result of 
an automobile motorcycle collision. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the time of the pre-trial the Honorable Leo-
nard W. Elton dismissed the defendant Dr. Vernon 
L. Stevenson from this action by granting his Mo-
tion For Summary Judgment on the grounds that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact as to 
1 
the existence of a principal-agent- relationship be-
tween the defendant Dr. Vernon L. Stevenson and 
the defendant Clover D. Christensen. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks to have the granting of his 
Motion For Summary Judgment by the pre-trial 
court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 13th day of February, 1963 at the inter-
section of First South Street and Tenth East Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah a collision occurred between an 
automobile owned by the respondent Dr. Vernon L. 
Stevenson and driven by the defendant Clover D. 
Christensen and a motorcycle operated by the de-
ceased, Kurt E. Larsen. At the time of said collision 
the deceased, Kurt E. Larsen, was operating a motor-
cycle pursuant to his duties as a funeral escort, and 
he subsequently died as a result of the injuries re-
ceived in said collision. 
The defendant Clover D. Christensen was oper-
ating the respondent's automobile pursuant to his 
employment as a service station operator. The un-
controverted facts of that relationship are as fallows: 
In approximately September, 1962 the defend-
ant Clover D. Christensen began operating a service 
station under a lease from Phillips Petroleum Com-
pany at 860 Third Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At about that time the respondent Dr. Vernon L. 
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Stevenson began patronizing the defendant's station 
for gasoline and other maintenance services, which 
patronage continued until approximately August, 
1963 (Christensen Dep. p. 11) . During that period 
of time the Stevenson automobile was washed on the 
average of once a week and was serviced twice a 
month by the defendant Clover D. Christensen. The 
usual practice was for Dr. Stevenson to notify the 
defendant Christensen that he wanted the car serv-
iced and Christensen would go to the doctor's place 
of business, which was about three blocks south of 
the service station, and from there he would drive 
the Stevenson automobile back to the station where 
he would service it after which he would return it 
to the doctor's office (Christensen Dep. 14). There 
were occasions when Dr. Stevenson would leave the 
automobile at the service station and walk to the 
office. On at least one occasion the Stevenson auto-
mobile was delivered to Dr. Stevenson at his home 
rather than to his office (Christensen Dep. 33). At 
no time was any additional charge made by the 
defendant Christensen for the service of picking up 
and delivering the Stevenson automobile. The ordin-
ary practice was that once the Stevenson car was in 
his possession Christensen would take over the main-
tenance and care of the car without specific direction 
from Dr. Stevenson, except that when mechanical 
repairs were needed he would first inform Dr. Stev-
enson about the need for such repairs and then would 
go ahead and complete them if so directed (Christen-
3 
sen Dep. p. 45). Dr. Stevenson did not instruct 
Christensen how to carry out the repairs. He would 
simply advise him what needed to be fixed and then 
leave it to Christensen to accomplish that end 
(Christensen Dep. 45). Prior to the date of the 
accident Christensen had advised Dr. Stevenson to 
have the tie rods replaced and also to have the tires 
balanced, which tires Christensen had recently sold 
him (Christensen Dep. pp. 18-19). On the day of 
the accident Dr. Stevenson came to the station and 
requested that Christensen replace the tie rods, wash 
the car, fill it with gas and balance the wheels 
(Christensen Dep. 18), which work was customarily 
done by Christensen's station (Christensen Dep. pp. 
19-20). Christensen agreed at that time to pick the 
car up at Dr. Stevenson's parking lot and return it to 
the station to complete the servicing. 
About one hour later Christensen went to the 
parking lot, drove Dr. Stevenson's car back to the 
service station and completed all the servicing ex-
cept for the balancing of the wheels (Christensen 
Dep. p. 46). Christensen discovered that his bubble 
wheel balancer was not working effectively. Since 
Dr. Stevenson was a good customer and he wanted to 
do a good job for him, he decided to take it to the 
Phillips Training Station where the wheels could be 
balanced on a reliable machine (Christensen Dep. 
pp. 21-22). At approximately 4 :30 P.M. Christensen 
left the service station driving the Stevenson ve-
hicle, his destination being the Phillips Training 
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Station. His only purpose for the trip was to bal-
ance the wheels of the Stevenson automobile (Chris-
tensen Dep. pp. 23, 40). While so driving Dr. 
Stevenson's automobile the defendant Christensen 
was involved in the collision with the deceased, Kurt 
E. Larsen, at the intersection of First South Street 
and Tenth East Street. At no time prior to the 
accident had Christensen informed Dr. Stevenson 
of the fact that he was unable to perform the wheel-
balancing procedure at his service station; and at 
no time prior to the accident did he inform Dr. Stev-
enson that he was taking the car to another service 
station or garage to complete that procedure (Chris-
tensen Dep. pp. 21-22, 9, 49). Christensen intended 
to get the wheels balanced at the Phillips Training 
Station, pay the Phillips Training Station for that 
service and then charge that amount to Dr. Steven-
son's credit card, as was the routine method of pay-
ing for Christensen's services. After the accident 
occurred Christensen notified Dr. Stevenson of the 
accident and assured hm that he would get the auto-
mobile fixed (Christensen Dep. 8). 
After consideration of these facts the pre-trial 
court concluded that the accident occurred while the 
vehicle was under the control of an independent con-
tractor, and that there was not a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the existence of an agency rela-
tionship between Dr. Stevenson and the defendant 
Christensen at the time of the accident, and thus 
granted the respondent's Motion For Summary 
Judgment. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
THE PRE-TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT INASMUCH AS THE 
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS S H 0 WE D A 
RELATIONSHIP OF INDEPENDENT CON-
TRACTOR AND NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MA-
TERIAL FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF 
AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE RESPONDENT AND THE DEFENDANT 
CHRISTENSEN. 
In granting the defendant Dr. Vernon L. Stev-
enson's Motion For Summary Judgment the pre-trial 
court stated: 
" ... It appearing that the undisputed 
facts as shown by the deposition of the de-
fendant Christensen which was published, 
show that Christensen's status was that of 
a bailee-independent contractor over whom 
the defendant Stevenson exercised no super-
vision or control in the manner in which 
Christensen serviced said vehicle. The acci-
dent having occurred while Christensen was 
driving the car to another establishment for 
the purpose of completing repairs, and the 
negligence, if any, of Christensen is not im-
putable to Stevenson; ... " (Order Granting 
Summary Judgment) 
Thus the court, after considering Christensen's dep-
osition and Stevenson's affidavit, which constituted 
all of the evidence which could be presented upon 
the relationship existing between Dr. Stevenson and 
Clover D. Christensen, concluded that as a matter 
of law the relationship of bailee-independent con-
tractor was established. 
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Respondent does not quarrel with the proposi-
tion stated by the appellant that the granting of a 
Summary J udgrnent is a severe measure for the 
court to invoke; however, the procedure does exist 
fo1· the specific purpose set forth in the case of Rich-
ards v. Anderson, 9 Utah (2d) 17, 337 Pac. (2d) 
59 (1959): 
" ... Yet it does have the salutary purpose 
of not requiring the time, trouble and expense 
of trial, when the best showing the plaintiff 
could make would not entitle him to recover 
under the law." 
It is respondent's position in this appeal that 
all of the evidence as to the relationship between 
the defendant Clover D. Christensen and the re-
spondent Dr. Vernon L. Stevenson was before the 
court, and that such facts presented no evidence of 
an agency relationship. The appellants in their Brief 
\Vould have us believe that the "any evidence" rule 
stated in the Adamson 'U. United Mines Workers 
case, 3 Utah (2d) 37, 177 Pac. (2d) 972 (1954) 
would prevent the granting of a Summary J udg-
ment where even an inference may be found from 
the evidence against the prevailing party. However, 
that case itself points out the correct boundaries of 
the "any evidence" rule. On page 41 of that decision 
the court states: 
"We believe that before the lower court 
could properly submit the question of agency 
to the jury, the burden was upon plaintiff to 
present facts and evidence which would sus-
7 
tain a verdict, and the evidence must do more 
than raise a conjecture or surmise that the 
ultimate fact is as alleged ... " 
Respondent believes that the evidence as developed 
showed clearly an independent contractor relation-
ship and that any inference of agency would be 
nothing more than conjecture or surmise of that 
fact. 
It has been established for many years in the 
jurisprudence of Utah that the essential element in 
a principal-agent relationship is the principal's right 
of control over the agent. Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 
115, 56 Pac. (2d) 1049. Plaintiffs, however, on 
page 7 of their Brief concede that there was no con-
trol by Stevenson over Christensen's repair and 
maintenance of the car, and that as to such work 
Christensen was clearly an independent contractor. 
Thus, we need not here belabor the point that when 
Christensen gained possession of Stevenson's car for 
the purpose of repairing it he was at that time 
an independent contractor providing a service, the 
accomplishment of which was not controlled by the 
respondent, Dr. Vernon L. Stevenson. 
Since the appellants conceded that an independ-
ent contractor relationship existed as to the repair 
and maintenance of the car, it remains only to be 
decided whether or not the plaintiffs were able to 
establish from the facts any competent evidence of 
the independent contractor relationship terminating 
and a principal-agent relationship arising. An anal-
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ysis of the facts and of the applicable law shows 
beyond a doubt that the pre-trial court correctly 
found that the bailee-independent contractor rela-
tionship existed at the time of the accident, and 
thus any negligence on Christensen's part was not 
imputable to Dr. Stevenson. 
It should first be pointed out that there is no 
Utah authority directly on this question. The case 
of Johnson v. Hardman, 6 Utah (2d) 421, 315 Pac. 
(2d) 853 ( 1957), quoted by the appellants, is not 
in point as that case did not concern itself with an 
independent contractor relationship as we have in 
the present case. In Hardman the question was 
whether or not an agency relationship had been cre-
ated between a potential vendor and vendee, a factual 
situation much different from the present case. 
The case of Morley v. Rodberg, 7 Utah (2d) 299, 
323 Pac. (2d) 717 (1958) is also of little help since 
it involves a fact situation where the owner of a 
car was riding in the car at the time of the accident, 
and the court was concerned with the presumption 
that the driver was presumed to be the agent of the 
owner where the owner is present in the car at the 
time of the alleged negligence. The presence of Dr. 
Stevenson within the car in the case at bar would 
obviously have created a jury question as to agency; 
however, he was not present. The Rodberg case is, 
however, helpful in this respect - it affirms the 
finding of the lower court that the garageman was 
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an independent contractor even where the owner was 
present and the presumption applied. In the present 
case there is no such presumption; and there is no 
factual issue involved since the owner was not pres-
ent. 
There must be a distinction drawn between the 
usual agency case and the present situation, because 
under the facts here an independent contractor rela-
tionship was established for the repair and mainten-
ance of the car, a point conceded by appellants. 
Therefore, the question is whether there is evidence 
of any alteration of that relationship. The general 
rule in that regard is stated in 35 A.L.R. (2d) at 
page 805: 
"In the great majority of cases involving 
negligent operation of a car by service person-
nel in connection with the work for which it 
has been placed in their custody, the Court 
has held that the owner is not liable." 
"This result is generally reached on the 
theory that the service establishment becomes 
the bailee of the car as an independent con-
tractor, since the owner is concerned only with 
the results of the work and not with the de-
tailed manner in which it is carried out." 
An examination of some of the cases thus referred 
to will show that as a practical matter where the 
car is delivered to the garage for servicing a pre-
sumption arises that a baliee-independent contractor 
relationship is initiated and that the owner is not 
liable as a matter of law unless a change in that 
relation is proved. 
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In the case of Nawrocki v. Cole, 249 Pac. (2d) 
969, Washington ( 1952), the owner of the car had 
experienced mechanical difficulties and had pulled 
into a service station and requested the service sta-
tion operator to check the car, which the operator 
did in a few minutes and then presented a bill for 
his services. The owner requested that the mechanic 
take it out on the highway and test it to be sure that 
it was operating properly. The mechanic, accom-
panied by one of the owner's guests, was involved 
in a collision while test driving the car. In the 
trial of the action the jury found that there was 
agency between the operator of the automobile and 
the owner. On appeal, the supreme court of Wash-
ington reversed and held as a matter of law that 
the garage operator was an independent contractor 
and his negligence, if any, could not be imputed to 
the owner. The court said, in viewing the evidence 
in favor of the plaintiff, that it nevertheless showed: 
"The evidence, so considered, establishes 
that the mechanic was engaged in an inde-
pendent business, that of repairing automo-
biles. He undertook a specified piece of work, 
the repair of defendant's car. Defendant did 
not know what had to be done, and the me-
chanic was free from his direction and control 
regarding the details or manner of repair. 
Defendant was concerned only with the result 
of the work and did not supervise it, except 
to request that the car be tested to determine 
whether the work of repair was completed. 
Neither defendant nor his guest, who rode 
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with the mechanic during the test, specified 
and controlled the exact place or kind of test 
to be made. The test became part of the work 
of repair, and the mechanic did what he deter-
mined from the test was necessary to finish 
the job. Not until then did he complete his 
work, deliver the car to defendant, and re-
ceive his pay .... 
"Upon these facts the mechanic became 
an independent c01itractor, as a 1natter of law, 
when he accepted defendant's car for repair. 
Defendant's request that the car be tested 
wouUl not change this relationship, as plain-
tiff contends, and it prevailed until the car 
was re-delivered to defendant. (Emphasis 
ours) 
"This is true, even if we assume that con-
sideration should be given to any presump-
tion or inference of fact, arising out of de-
fendant's ownership of the car, that the me-
chanic was an agent of the defendant. The 
evidence introduced by defendant on this issue 
being uncontradicted, unimpeached, clear, and 
convincing, and not being met by any evidence 
of plaintiff to the contrary, the presumption 
cannot make a case for the plaintiff on this 
theory." (Supra, pp. 970-971) 
In the case of Councell v. Douglas, 126 N.E. 
(2d) 597, Ohio (1955) the owner had taken his car 
into the service station to be serviced and washed. 
He requested that someone ride home with him and 
return the car to the station for the accomplishment 
of the work. While returning the car to the station 
the attendant was involved in an accident. Upon 
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trial of the case the owner was held liable · however 
' ' on appeal the supreme court of Ohio found as a 
matter of law that the owner was not responsible for 
the negligence of the service station attendant. The 
court said: 
"There is nothing in the evidence tending 
to prove that in riding home with the defend-
ant and the driving of his car back to the 
service station were not done merely as inci-
dence to rendering this service to his auto-
mobile and as part of the result for which 
defendant had contracted. There certainly 
could have been no occasion for defendant to 
request anyone to ride back with him and 
drive his car back if he had not wanted the 
service station to render the service on his 
automobile for which he had contracted." 
(Supra,p.601) 
And in the case of Ford v. Fox, 73 A. (2d) 270, 
New Jersey (1950) one Fox took his car to Flanna-
gan's service station to have it inspected. Flannagan 
advised him that he would have to have a window 
installed before it could pass inspection and that 
he would have to have it put in by some other busi-
nessman. Fox instructed Flannagan to take care of 
what needed to be done to get it inspected. The next 
day Flannagan's employee, De Young, drove the car 
to Candon to have it repaired and inspected. How-
ever, he was unable to have the window installed 
due to mechanical difficulties with the door, and thus 
he could not get it inspected. As he was returning to 
the garage he was involved in a collision with the 
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plaintiff. At the pre-trial the parties agreed that 
the automobile had been delivered to Flannagan for 
the purpose of making repairs and adjustments 
thereto, and that at the time of the accident the 
automobile had not yet been returned to its owner, 
and that De Young had taken the automobile from 
the place of business of Flannagan for the purpose 
of having it inspected. At the end of the testimony 
Fox moved for a directed verdict on the ground that 
there was no agency established. The motion was 
denied and on appeal the appellate court reversed, 
holding as a matter of law that the directed verdict 
should have been granted. In doing so the court 
said: 
"In the instant matter the facts and 
reasonable inferences therefrom are, in all 
material respects, not in dispute. We consider 
that they compelled a direction of judgment 
in favor of Fox on the ground that the car 
was not being operated by his agent or servant 
at the time of the accident. Fox was concerned 
with the end result, namely, having his car 
inspected. He was not concerned with the 
means employed but left those, including the 
requisite repairs, to Flannagan. His arrange-
ments with Flannagan contemplated no re-
tention of control by him from the time of 
his delivery of the car until its return to him 
inspected. He had no control over the driver 
De Young, or over his route or manner of 
driving. Flannagan's undertaking to have the 
window installed and the car inspected was 
incidental to his business and De Young, at 
the time of the accident, was driving the car 
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?n his behalf ~s his agent or servant. Although 
it may be said that De Young was operating 
the car with Fox's permission or acquiescence 
he was not his agent or servant within the 
sight of authorities. While in some states 
statutes have been enacted imposing liability 
upon the owner for injuries resulting from the 
negligent operation of his car upon a showing 
without more, that his car was being operated 
with his express or implied consent, the New 
Jersey legislature has not taken similar ac-
tion." (Supra, p. 72) 
These cases illustrate the approach taken by the 
great majority of cases in the owner-service station 
situation. In the cases above cited each one involved 
an activity by the service station personnel wherein 
they were driving the car, either to get repairs 
accomplished at another place of business, to test-
drive the car, or to deliver the car to or from the 
garage to the owner, and in all three it was held as 
a matter of law that those activities did not constitute 
evidence of a termination of the independent con-
tractor relationship and an initiation of a principal-
agent relationship. The present case is much easier 
than those cases inasmuch as the facts here clearly 
show that the purpose for the operation of the car 
by Christensen was to balance the wheels, which 
job he had undertaken to do but due to circumstances 
that day could not be accomplished at his station. 
Appellants are straining at a gnat when they 
argue that Christensen's operation of the car at the 
time of the accident was not a part of the repair 
15 
or maintenance process. If that were so, the courts 
would find themselves making tenuous delineations 
as to whether a particular act constitutes part of the 
repair process. For example, under appellants' 
thesis, would it be part of the repair process when 
the service station attendant got into the car to drive 
it onto the grease rack and would it be part of the 
service process when the station attendant pulled 
the car up to the gas pumps? It appears quite obvious 
that the only way Christensen could have completed 
the services that he contracted to perform would be 
to go to another station and there get the work com-
pleted. The undisputed facts also show that Dr. Stev-
enson had in no way restricted Christensen in how 
or in what manner he was to complete the repairs. 
Instead he was interested only in the end result 
(Christensen Dep. p. 45) . 
Appellants would have the court believe that 
the operation of the car by Christensen in driving to 
the Phillips Training Station to complete the wheel 
balancing was a mere accommodation for the re-
spondent, and was thereby evidence of an agency 
relationship which should have been submitted to a 
jury. This contention is untenable. First of all, the 
undisputed facts arising from Christensen's Deposi-
tion show that the reason for the trip to the Phillips 
Training Station was to complete the repairs which 
he had promised to do for Dr. Stevenson, which he 
could not do as a result of his own defective equip-
ment. When questioned as to why he decided to 
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complete the maintenance at another station Chris-
' tensen stated in his Deposition on pages 21-22: 
"Q. And then you started to do this wheel 
balancing, and you say your machine was 
not functioning properly? 
A. Yes, that's right. 
Q. What was wrong with it if you know? 
A. Well, it was one of the less expensive 
machines, and it was what they call a 
bubble balancer. It has a little float 
bubble in the top, and this bubble wouldn't 
center the way it should to balance the 
wheel. And he was a good customer of 
mine; I wanted to do a good job on his 
car; that's when I decided I better take 
it some p"lace else to have these wheels 
balanced. I didn't trust the machine. 
(Emphasis ours) 
Q. Did you talk with Dr. Stevenson about 
taking it outside of your station for this 
work? 
A. No, I didn't." 
Thus, by a clear and unequivocal statement, Chris-
tensen states the motivation for his operation of the 
respondent's car: To protect a regular and profit-
able business relationship between himself and the 
respondent. Christensen was looking after his own 
business interests. He was not about to inform Dr. 
Stevenson that he had better take his automobile 
to another place of business to have the wheel bal-
ancing done. Instead, Christensen saw a way to 
achieve the end which Dr. Stevenson had requested, 
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and at the same time retain his undivided patronage. 
The fact that he did not receive profit on that par-
ticular procedure is a myopic view of the business 
relationship between a service station and its steady 
customers, which relationship thrives upon uninter-
rupted good-will. Respondent agrees that the at-
tempt by Christensen to get the wheels balanced was 
a benefit to Stevenson, just as was all of the other 
maintenance and repair work done by Christensen. 
However, Christensen was also benefiting in his role 
as an independent contractor from the repairs and 
maintenance and he stood to benefit materially from 
the balancing of the wheels inasmuch as he retained 
the goodwill and future patronage of a steady cus-
tomer. Respondent is unable to see how the bailee-
independent contractor relationship between Chris-
tensen and Stevenson was interrupted from the fact 
that Christensen's equipment was defective and un-
able to complete the repairs which he had contracted 
to do. Under the appellants' theory in this case each 
time a person employed an independent contractor 
to accomplish a certain end for him he would be 
running the chance of having that relationship turn 
into a principal-agent relationship if, while accom- 1 
plishing that objective, the independent contractor, 
due to his own fault, is unable to fulfill his contract 
and thereby has to employ a subcontractor to finish , 
it for him. This obviously is not the law. 
The appellants cite the case of Andrus v. Cox, 
23 S.W. (2d) 1066, Miss. (1930) for the proposition 
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that when an independent contractor performs an 
accommodation for a customer he thereby becomes 
an agent. First, let us point out that the Andrus v. 
Cox case involved a situation where the car was 
being delivered to the owner after the repairs had 
been completed, and the court thought the delivery 
was not part of the services which had been con-
tracted. For that reason alone the Andrus case is 
not applicable to the present situation where the 
automobile was being driven for the purpose of 
accomplishing the contracted repairs and mainten-
ance work. The Andrus case has also been widely 
criticized for its legal points and appears to present 
an extreme minority position in the United States. 
In the case of No"lan v. Nally, 342 S.W. (2d) 
400, Kentucky ( 1961) the owner had rented his car 
to two individuals who took it into a service station 
for repairs. An accident occurred when the service 
station attendant was returning the car to the owner 
after the repairs had been completed. In the trial 
of the action the court dismissed the two individuals 
who had rented the car, but denied the owner's Mo-
tion For Summary Judgment. On appeal the court 
of appeals held as a matter of law that the service 
station attendant was not an agent of the owner, 
and it was error thus not to dismiss him from the 
action. The court then took note of the Andrus v. 
Cox case and made the following critical evaluation: 
"It appears to us reasonable to say that 
picking up and delivering a motor vehicle by 
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a garageman is _incidental to the job he will 
perf.orm as an mdependent contractor, and 
the independent contractor relationship exists 
as long as he has exclusive control of the ve-
hicle. An a~temP_t to chang~ the lef!al effect 
of the relationship at any given point in the 
whole transaction by proof of some fact which 
has no bearing upon such control can lead to 
notll'ing but uncertainty and even absurdity." 
(Emphasis ours) 
"In the present case the evidence presents 
issues as to whether the truck was to be de-
livered (1) as an accommodation, (2) as a 
part of a repair job, or (3) as a customary 
service. Not one of these questions has any 
bearing upon the exclusive control of the oper-
ation of the truck, which was clearly in the 
hands of the garageman." (Supra at 403) 
In the present case there does not ever appear 
a legitimate question as to the purpose of Christen-
sen's operation of the respondent's car. 
In the case of Reynolds v. Bounds, 383 S.W. 
(2d) 496, Arkansas (1964) the owner had delivered 
the car to the service station and requested that he 
be driven out to his place of business. As the attend-
ant was returning the car to the garage to service it 
the accident occurred. A jury verdict was returned 
against the owner of the vehicle. The appellate 
court reversed the trial court and held as a matter of 
law that there was no jury question as to whether an 
agency had been created between the owner and the 
service station attendant in respect to the trip back 
to the station. In doing so the court noted the various 
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cases supporting the general rule stated in 35 A.L.R. 
(2d) 804, wherein a service station attendant is 
deemed to be an independent contractor while he has 
exclusive control of the car for that purpose. The 
court also expressly rejected the Andrus v. Cox case 
and the suggestion there that agency was created 
when the car was delivered as an accommodation to 
the owner. The court, in holding that there was no 
jury question of agency, said: 
"The tone of all the testimony on this 
point convinces us that Davidson was simply 
accommodating a fairly new customer who 
had still other trucks and equipment that 
would require servicing. Davidson testified 
that he frequently delivered cars for his cus-
tomers as an accommodation when asked, al-
though he didn't advertise the fact and did 
not customarily go out of the city limits to 
pick up or deliver a car. Davidson further 
testified that in the instant case he wanted the 
business and was willing to accompany Smith 
and bring the truck back; and that he was 
going out there (past the city limits) and 
bring it back for the profit he could make off 
the wash, grease and oil change, and he didn't 
ask how far he had to go to get the job. It 
is undisputed that Smith gave Davidson no 
instructions relative to the return trip and 
that the purpose of the return trip was solely 
to accomplish the servicing job. (Supra, p. 
499) 
And in the previously cited case of Coiincell v. Doug-
las, supra, the court swept aside an argument by 
the plaintiff that the trip by the service station em-
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ployee was taken for the benefit and convenience of 
the owner, by saying: 
"We fail to see any point to such argu. 
ment unless it represents an attempt to per-
suade this court to revert to an expanded 
doctrine of the liability of the employer or 
principal contractor which it rejected in 1858. 
. . . Where an independent contractor is em-
ployed the employer of said contractor usually 
requests the contractor to render the service 
contracted for and almost always does so for 
his benefit or for his convenience or both." 
(Supra, p. 601). 
And in reference to the delivery service provided, the 
court observed: 
" ... Some of this evidence clearly indicates 
and it is always entirely consistent with the 
usual effort of a service station to attract a 
customer by making it convenient for him to 
contract with the service station for services 
required for his automobile." (Supra, p. 601) 
There are numerous cases with similar hold-
ings, a few of which are the following: Frye v. 
Sinclair Oi'l and Gas Company, 249 S.W. (2d) 102, 
Texas ( 1952), where a service station was em-
ployed to pick up trucks every weekend and service 
and wash them and return them to the owner's 
place of business. While on one of those trips the 
service station attendant was involved in an acci-
dent. The trial court held as a matter of law that 
there was no agency. This was affirmed on appeal, 
·with the court basing its decision upon the fact that 
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there was no showing that the owner exercised any 
control over the work to be done by the service sta-
tion and its employees. The court then also noted 
a statement in the case of Gatz v. Smith, 205 S.W. 
( 2d) 6] 6, where the court said: 
"The test is not whether the service was 
charged for. The test is whether the service 
was done under the orders or authority of the 
repairman. If it was, the acts of the employee, 
done in obedience to the orders of his employer, 
are the acts of the employer - not of his cus-
tomer." (Supra, p. 618) 
In the case of Fry v. Robinson Printer, Inc., 155 
So. (2d) 645, Florida (1963) the plaintiff was in-
jured when the employee of the service station was 
driving the owner's car onto the grease rack. The 
court granted a Summary Judgment in favor of the 
owner, which was affirmed on appeal. 
Ramsey v. Price, 161 So. (2d) 778, Mississippi 
(1964) was a case where the service station attend-
ant had driven the owner to his place of business and 
was returning the car to the station for servicing 
when the accident occurred. The trial court held as 
a matter of law that the owner was not liable for 
the actions of the service station attendant, and on 
appeal this was affirmed. The court said: 
" ... When the service establishment em-
ployee is in charge of the automobile driving 
it to or from the service establishment for 
servicing, he is not the agent of the owner but 
of his employer, the service establishment. 
Even if Mrs. Rogers instructed Price to re-
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turn the automobile to Torres' service station 
such instruction does not make her liable foi: 
his negligence while so operating the auto-
mobile. The service station establishment as 
an independent contractor becomes a bailee of 
the automobile while it is being thus operated 
and serviced, and is responsible for the negli-
gence of its employee. The great majority of 
the courts adhere to this rule. There is prac-
tically no authority to the contrary." (Supra 
at 779) ' 
In the case of Kemelhar v. Kohn, 159 N.E. (2d) 
788, Ohio ( 1959) the owner took her car to a car 
wash and asked the attendant to drive her home and 
then bring the car back to wash it. When he hesi-
tated in doing so, she told him she would be responsi- , 
ble for the car. While driving the car the attendant 
was involved in an accident. The trial court rendered 
judment in behalf of the plaintiff and against the 
owner. On appeal the court held as a matter of law 
that the evidence did not establish an agency rela-
tionship. In coming to that conclusion the court said: 
" ... Any attempt to create a relationship 
between defendant and Norman (the station 
attendant) different from that of independent i 
contractor must be established outside the 
bargain of agreeing to wash the defendant's 
car .... " (Supra, p. 789) , 
It is undisputed in the case at bar that there was no 
bargain or agreement between Christensen and 
Stevenson for the operation of Stevenson's automo-
bile outside the repair and maintenance contract. 
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In the case of Andrews v. Bloom, 29 S.W. (2d) 
284, Arkansas ( 1930) the owner had asked the 
garageman to come and pick up the car and service 
it. The accident occurred after the garage attendant 
had picked up the car and was driving to the service 
station. The evidence showed that this service was 
regularly performed for customers, although there 
was no extra charge made for it and no advertising 
was made of that service. The owner was held liable 
by the trial court. On appeal the supreme court of 
Arkansas reversed as a matter of law and dismissed 
the action against the owner. In doing so the court 
said in reference to the service of picking up the car: 
". . . But this practice was a means 
whereby Ragdale's service was enlarged, and, 
in charging for work done upon the car, he 
received compensation for sending for it and 
delivering it .... " (Supra, p. 286) 
In the case of Siegrist Bakery Company v. 
Smith, 36 S.W. (2d) 80, Tennessee (1931) the car 
had been driven to the garage for an inspection to 
find out what was wrong with it. The garage owner 
took the customer home and was bringing the car 
back for the inspection when the accident occurred. 
The evidence showed that the service was an accom-
modation by the garage to its customers. The court 
prefaced its holding by saying: 
" ... In the case before us there is no con-
flict whatever in the evidence, nor do we think 
any state of facts is presented from which 
contradictory inferences might be drawn. We 
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accordingly feel free to decide the case as a 
matter of law." (Supra, p. 82) 
The court then reversed the trial court's judgment 
against the owner and dismissed the owner from the 
lawsuit. The court, in discharging the owner, stated 
that the only important question in that case was 
whether or not the bailment of the car by the owner 
to the garageman had been accomplished. The court 
said it made no difference where the rights of third 
parties are involved whether the bailment was for 
inspection or for repairs, and whether it is gratu-
itous or for a reward, and that even if the car had 
been delivered merely for inspection this was inci-
dent to Smith's repair work and in furtherance of 
that work. 
And in a case similar in fact to the case at bar, 
Oakley v. Thornberry, 171 S.E. 426, West Virginia 
(1933) the owner made an arrangement with the 
service station operator to do repair work on the 
car and arranged for the service station operator 
to drive the owner's son to school, after which the 
service station operator was then to take charge of 
the car and drive it back to his station. As the serv-
ice station operator was driving back to the station 
he realized that he had failed to procure parts which 
he would need for repairing the automobile so he 
slowed down and was negotiating a turn to go back 
to the city for the parts when he was involved in 
a collision. The owner was held liable in the trial 
of the action. The court set aside the judgment and ) 
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stated that the situation was no different than if 
the automobile had been left at the service station 
itself. The court concluded that the garageman be-
came a bailee of the car when he took possession of 
it after the owner's son had left it with him. The 
court stated the proper rule was: 
" ... But if under the contract the owner 
has specified the results only and the other 
party is left to his own election as to means 
and methods, the latter is an independent con-
tractor and not an employee." Supra, at 427-
428 
It should be adequately clear from the cases 
above cited that an accommodation to a customer 
does not disrupt the independent contractor rela-
tionship, and especially is that true where the action 
of the service personnel is directly part of the repair 
or maintenance of the automobile. Thus the case at 
bar is much easier than the delivery and return 
cases above cited. The facts here not only show that 
the work was a benefit to Christensen, the inde-
pendent contractor, but was also part of the repair 
process, thus obviating any question of fact as to 
the relationship between Christensen and Stevenson. 
The appellants would also have us believe that 
there may be some inferences arising from the facts 
which should be submitted to a jury; however, if 
such inferences do exist they surely must be classi-
fied as remote and speculative and, therefore, of no 
moment to this appeal. A similar argument was 
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encountered in the case of Butenshon v. Shoesmith 
' 228 Pac. ( 2d) 426, Oregon ( 1951). In that case the 
owner took his car to a garage for paint and body 
work. He needed to be taken into town so an agent 
of the garage took him there and on the way back 
to the garage was involved in an accident. The facts 
show that such a service was for the convenience 
of the garage's customers. The court held as a mat-
ter of law that no agency relationship had been 
established and thus the owner was not liable to the 
plaintiff. The only factual issue was whether or not 
on the day of the accident the defendant had made 
the specific request to be taken into town or whether 
the service was something which he took for granted. 
The court said that the conflict was concerning an 
immaterial point and that the evidence was undis-
puted in showing that the garageman, acting through 
his agent, was bringing the owner's car from his 
place of business to their garage as a part of the 
service they undertook to render under a contract 
to repair the car. The plaintiff in that case argued 
that the question was properly submitted to the jury 
because of the inference of agency arising from the 
fact that the defendant was the owner of the auto-
mobile. The court rejected that contention, and in 
doing so referred to the case of Kantol,a v. Lovell 
Auto Company, 72 Pac. (2d) 61, Oregon (1937), 
wherein the court expressly rejected in a similar 
fact situation the argument that a jury question 
was presented by the inferences raised by the fact 
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that the defendant was the owner of the car which 
was being driven at the time of the accident. The 
court there concluded: 
"That where, as here, the uncontradicted 
evidence shows that the driver was not acting 
for or in the business of the owner, and it 
was also shown that the owner was not pres-
ent and had no control over the operation of 
the automobile, the inference was rebutted 
and at an end, since there were no other 
grounds of liability claimed against the de-
fendant, it was the duty of the court, when 
requested by the defendant, to direct a verdict 
in his favor." (Supra, p. 603) 
And in this respect we note the case of Saltas 
v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 Pac. (2d) 493 (1940) 
wherein the court held that mere ownership of an 
automobile does not establish a prima-facie case of 
agency but rather there must be evidence of the 
agency relationship. And in the case previously re-
ferred to of Morley v. Rodberg, supra, the court 
there by inference indicated that there would be no 
presumption of agency where the owner was not 
present in the car. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears without question that the pre-trial 
court was correct in granting the respondent's Mo-
tion For Summary Judgment. The undisputed facts 
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established that at the time of the accident Christen-
sen was operating the car as pai·t of the repair pro-
cess and that he was doing it in order to maintain a 
good business relationship with his steady customer 
by completing the job he had contracted to do. The 
applicable law shows the correct rule in these cases 
' 
namely, that there must be proof of an agency rela-
tionship in order to disrupt the independent con-
tractor relationship which arises when the car is 
turned over to the service station operator, and such 
proof must show some degree of right to control by 
the owner over the operator of the car. The appel-
lants in the present case concede that there was no 
right to control and that an independent contractor 
relationship did arise initially when Christensen 
took possession of the automobile. They, therefore, 
rely merely on the assertion that there is an infer- 1 
ence of agency arising from the fact that this was 
an accommodation to Dr. Stevenson. However, the 
cited cases show the great majority of the jurisdic-
tions reject the accommodation theory as a basis for 
finding agency. And even more obvious here is the 
fact that the trip was an essential step in Christen-
sen's completion of the maintenance and repairs 
which he had undertaken as an independent con-
tractor and, therefore, was not an accommodation 1 
to Dr. Stevenson. 
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Respondent respectfully submits that the pre-
trial court correctly granted his Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT, 
AND REX J. HANSON 
By W. BRENT WILCOX 
Attorneys for respondent, 
Dr. Vernon L. Stevenson 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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